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INTRODUCTION

Nigeria is a multi-cultural society with over 250 ethnic groups as
well as three maj or religious groups namely Christianity, Islam and Afri
can Traditional Religion (ATR). With an estimated population of about
200 million people, "the Hausa-Fulani, the Yoruba and the Igbo account
for almost half of Nigeria' s population, and many smaller groups tend to
cluster around these three, creating a tri-polar ethnic structure around
which competition strategies intensify" (CRISE Working Paper 44,
March 2007). The Human Rights Watch report also observes that, "the
country is divided along religious lines, with the boundaries between
Muslim and Christian often overlapping with some of the most important
ethnic and cultural divides" (Human Rights Watch, 2006).
The cultural diversity of the Nigerian state naturally creates a plat
form for competitive struggles between and among the existing interest
groups. For instance, since the return to democratic governance on May
29, 1 999, the country has witnessed very violent and turbulent ethnic and
religiously induced conflicts, some of which have seriously shaken its
political, economic and social foundations to the extent that the country ' s
'hard earned ' Fourth Republic has been o n the brink of collapse. This
ominous trajectory currently facing the Nigerian state has made Profes
sor Isaac Olawale Albert argue that:
Since Nigeria transited from military dictatorship to
multi-party democracy on 29 May, 1 999. The country
has been bedeviled by various forms of violent social
conflicts. Thousands of people lost their lives, were
maimed or displaced from their communities as a result
of these problems. While some of the conflicts had their
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roots in the past historical circumstances of the con
cerned communities, some others were "manufactured"
by the elites, seeking to stretch the liberty inherent in the
new democratic process in Nigeria to a breaking, if not
absurd point (Albert, 200 1 ).
The reality of this situation is that the Nigerian elites often find it very
convenient to employ ethnicity and religion as tools in order to manipu
late Nigerians in their power play game, owing to the hypnotic and ma
nipulative power of ethnicity and religion on Nigerians. As Momodu
rightly observes :
Religious and ethnic manipulations hold sway between
and among ethnic groups with large number of illiterate
populations and high incidence of poverty. This situation
makes it possible for ethnic or religious entrepreneurs to
assume the role of 'messiahs ' or 'freedom fighters ' for
their ethnic or religious groups. In actual fact, the goals
and interests that they seek to achieve are disguised as
those of their ethnic or religious groups, which they
claim to represent. Whenever these goals and interests
appear to be threatened, they fan the embers of ethnic or
religious hatred and conflict between their own ethnic or
religious groups against the ethnic or religious group
they perceive to be threatening their goals, using them as
'ethnic or religious sacrificial lambs ' for the sole pur
pose of achieving their own selfish ends (Momodu,
20 l 4-emphasis added) .
Ethnicity and religion play a very important role both in the private and
public lives of Nigerians and this is affirmed by an authoritative survey
carried out in 2000 on Attitudes to Democracy and Markets in Nigeria,
which notes that ethnicity "is demonstrably the most conspicuous group
identity in Nigeria" (Lewis and Bratton 2000). Thus, the survey found
out that almost one-half (48 .2%) of Nigerians chose to label themselves
with an ethnic (including linguistic and local-regional) identity, com
pared to almost one-third (28.4%) who opted for class identities, and
2 1 .0 percent who chose a religious identity (Lewis and Bratton 2000) .
The study specifically indicated that "Nigerians tend to cluster more
readily around the cultural solidarities of kin than the class solidarities of
the workplace" (Lewis and Bratton 2000).
The findings of the above scholars point to the fact that most Nigeri
ans, about two-thirds of the country' s population, show more loyalty to
their ethnic and religious constituencies. This places both ethnicity and
religion in a serious competition for the soul of the Nigerian state, just as
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God and the devil are competing for the soul of humanity. This danger
ous competition has often bred violent ethno-religious conflicts in the
country. Salawu (20 1 0) observed that "about 40% of ethno- religious
conflicts are credited to the fourth Republic of Nigeria, while observers
have equally described the situation as a permanent feature of the Nigeria
state," ethno-religious cohflicts tend to always stretch the bounds of
unity to a potential snapping point (Jega, 2002).
Inter-group relations in Nigeria are largely determined by ethnic,
religious, economic and cultural factors thus creating fault-lines in most
Nigerian communities. In particular, inter-group relations between and
among ethnic and religious groups in Nigeria are characterized fre
quently by mutual suspicion and hatred to the extent that at the slightest
provocation conflict is inevitable between communities ; in most cases
assuming very violent dimensions . This is the reason for instance why
Okwueze ( 1 995) rightly observed that, "Nigeria is one of the countries
where religion and ethnic conflicts have wrecked much havoc on the
advancement, unity and prosperity of her citizens and the development of
the nation as a whole."
Nigeria is also one of the African countries most severely affected
by violence. It is ranked 1 48 out of 1 62 countries worldwide in the
Global Peace Index (Vision for Humanity, Global Peace Index, 20 1 3) . It
has the third largest number of political violence events in Armed Con
flict Location & Event Dataset (ACLED), and it is ranked 1 6th in the
Fund for Peace Failed States Index 20 1 3 (Fund for Peace, 20 1 3). A 20 1 2
survey of Nigerians on crime and victimization by the CLEEN Founda
tion found that, on average, 5% of respondents had personally been vic
tims of armed violence (CLEEN Foundation, 20 1 2).
There are many ethno-religious conflicts that have occurred in Ni
geria. For instance, Mohammed (2005) contends that before the present
democratic dispensation in Nigeria, there were ethno-religious conflicts

that claimed so many lives and property. Some examples of such crises
include: the Maitatsine religious disturbances that ravaged parts of Kano,
Bauchi, and Maiduguri in the early 1 980s, which also spilled over to
Jimeta-Yola 1 984; the Zango Kataf crises in Kaduna State 1 992; and the
Kafanchan College of Education Muslim-Christian riots and Kaduna Pol
ytechnic Muslim-Christian skirmishes 1 98 1 and 1 982. There are also
other incidents of ethno-religious conflicts including: the Bulum kutu
Christian-Muslim riots 1 982; Usman Danfodio University Sokoto 1 982;
and the Muslim-Christian clash during a Christian procession at Easter in
Ilorin, Kwara State 1 986. Other examples are the ethno -religious con
flict of July 1 8, 1 999 between the Oodua people congress and Hausa
traders at Shagamu in Ogun State; the February ethno-religious crisis
between Zagon and Kataf communities in Kaduna State between 1 999-
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200 1 ; and the protracted ethno- religious conflict in Jos, plateau State in
200 1 , 2002, 2008, 20 1 0 and 201 1 . And of course, the protracted ethno
religious conflicts in Wukari Local Government Area of Taraba State
which started from 2000 to date, which is the central focus of this paper.
The following thematic areas form the basis for discussion in this paper:
•

•

•

•

•

Literature review, conceptual clarifications and theoretical
framework,
Origin and causes of ethno-religious conflicts in Wukari Local
Government Area of Taraba State,
Costs of ethno-religious conflicts on inter-group relations in
Wukari Local Government Area of Taraba State,
Suggested solutions to the management of ethno-religious con
flicts on inter-group relations in Wukari Local Government Area
of Taraba State, and
Conclusion.

LITERATURE REVIEW, CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS AND THEORETICAL
FRAMEWORK
CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS
RELIGION

Religion, according to Adeniyi ( 1 993), refers to a body of truths ,
law s and rites b y which man is subordinated t o the transcendent being.
This implies that religion deals with norms and rules that emanated from
God and which must be followed by the believers. Ejizu ( 1 993) provides
another definition of religion. According to him, religion is man ' s intui
tion of the sacred and ultimate reality and his expression of that aware
ness in concrete life. In essence, religion can be defined as the belief
system held by a group of people towards a supreme being which they
revere and believe can guarantee their security and welfare and their ex
istence here on earth and in the hereafter.
ETHNIC GROUP

The term "ethnic" is derived from a Greek adjective ethnikos, mean
ing "national, foreign, gentile." The adjective is derived from the noun
ethnos, "people, nation, foreign people," that in the plural phrase ta ethn
meaning "foreign nations" (The American Heritage Dictionary of the En
glish Language, Fourth Edition, 2000) . However, the task of defining
ethnic group is somewhat difficult. Hence, many scholars believe that
definitions of what constitutes an ethnic group or an ethnic minority are
subject to much discussion (see Coleman and Salt, 1 996; Bulmer, 1 996;
Ballard, 1 996; Solomos and Black, 1 996).
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The variations in the definitions of ethnic group and the lack of
agreement among scholars on what should constitute the meaning of an
ethnic group is responsible for the multiplicity of definitions on the con
cept by various scholars in ethnic studies, ethnic conflict, sociology, po
litical science and related d i s c i p l ine s . However, the common
denominators in the many descriptions that have been given to ethnic
group are: people residing within the same geographical territory, people
who share the same historical memories, common origins, common iden
tity, language, culture, and aspirations. What really is an ethnic group?
Modood; Berthoud; Lakey; Nazroo; Smith; Virdee and Beishon ( 1 997)
define an ethnic group as a community whose heritage offers important
characteristics in common between its members and which makes them
distinct from other communities . There is a boundary, which separates
'us' from 'them' , and the distinction would probably be recognized on
both sides of that boundary. Quaker-Dokubo (200 1 ) also perceives ethnic
group as pertaining to organized activities by persons linked by a con
sciousness of a special identity, who j ointly seek to maximize their cor
porate political, economic and social interest. Willigenburg ( 1 995) refers
to ethnic group as "cultural nations which are bound together in the first
place by a common culture and which lack the internationally recognised
organization of a sovereign state".
ETHNO- RELIGIOUS C ONFLICT
Ethno-religious conflict refers to a situation in which members of an
ethnic group practicing the same religion engage in mutually opposing
coercive interactions with members of another ethnic group practicing
the same but different religion from the former group. Ethno-religious
conflict is often characterised by a mixture of both ethnic and religious
agitations. It is also a situation in which at least the interests or goals of
members of an ethnic group who belong to the same religious group are
in opposition to the interests or goals of another ethnic group practicing
the same religion but different from the former group is exclusively de
fined in ethnic and religious terms. Ethnicity and religion are tools for
identity construction by the elites who draw on the mesmerizing and ma
nipulative tendencies of both ethnicity and religion in competitive situa
tions. The combination of ethnicity and religion for identity construction
produces a strong platform for identity mobilization.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
TERRITORIAL I MPERATIVE THEORY
The study also adopted the theory of Territorial Imperative devel
oped by Robert Ardrey in 1 967, in which he traced the animal origin of
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property, nations and territoriality. A territory is defined as an area of
space which an animal or group of animals defend as an exclusive pre
serve. It is within such territory that the basic needs and interests of such
animals are gratified. These needs include: security of space and food,
identity, prestige, etc. They therefore defend such an area at all costs and
strive to keep it out those who undermine their interests and needs. Fol
lowing the above postulation, all animals, including man, have the natu
ral tendency or instinct to be territorial and possessive, especially when
their territories and possessions are threatened. In order to ward-off this
threat, they will employ any means available to them to defend their
territories and possessions. This is the reason why Ardrey ( 1 967) opined
that "if we defend the title to our land or the sovereignty of our country,
we do it for reasons no different, no less innate, no less ineradicable, than
do lower animals."
In the same manner, Sherif and Sherif ( 1 969) support this view by
arguing that territorial aggression in animals is based on the relatively
simple chemical, tactile and visual discriminations involved in detecting
unfamiliar 'opponents ' while for humans the concept of 'territory' de
pends on complex cultural symbolizations of property or 'homeland' .
People, they pointed out, are quite capable of territorial loyalty without
actually living in the territory itself. Therefore, conflict may ensue in an
attempt by individuals, groups, or countries to defend their territories,
land, traditions, culture, and property they so value. For instance, Tor
Tiv, the paramount ruler of the Tiv people observes that "in many tradi
tions, land matters are closely tied to the custom of the people; hence it
could be very volatile" (Torkula, 2002).
This, in part, explains the reasons why ethnic groups fight over land
and territory. Indeed, scholars have argued that territorially concentrated
groups in divided societies are more likely to demand self-determination
(Saideman and Ayres, 2000 and Toft 2003 ; Toft and Saideman 20 1 0) and
to be engaged in violent conflict in its pursuit (Fearon and Laitin 1 999;
Weidmann, Rod, Cederman 20 1 0) . This also explains the situation of the
protracted ethno-religious conflicts in Wukari between the Jukun Chris
tians allied with the Jukun traditionalists versus the Jukun Muslims sup
ported by Hausa Muslims. The latter feels threatened by the resolve of
the former to chase them out of their ancestral land and also deprive
them of participating in both the political affairs of Wukari Local Gov
ernment and in the Traditional Council of Wukari. As a result, the two
groups have been engulfed in a fierce battle for the contest over who
owns Wukari land and who is qualified to enjoy the rights and benefits of
being indigenes of Wukari Local Government Area of Taraba State. The
conflict between the two groups in Wukari, Taraba State is a classic ex
ample of a struggle over territory and ethnic dominance.
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ORIGIN AND CAUSES OF VIOLENT ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN
WUKART LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA OF
TARABA STATE, NIGERIA

Inter-group relations among communities in Nigeria is rooted in the
colonial history of the Nigerian state. However, inter-group relations in
Nigeria predate the pre-colonial era and as a matter of fact, inter-group
relations among Nigeria' s pre-colonial societies could be said to be both
harmonious and conflictive and span diverse areas such as : cultural ex
changes, commerce, politics, and social spheres. But one fascinating as
pect of inter-group relations in the Nigerian pre-colonial societies was
that ethnic migrants were in many places integrated and assimilated into
their host communities, even inter-marrying. Buttressing this argument,
Olaniyi (200 1 ) cites the case of Yoruba Ayagi quarters in Kano who after
a century of settlement had been assimilated into Hausa culture. Usman
( 1 98 1 ) describes a similar assimilation process in respect to diverse
groups that migrated into Katsina and became "absorbed into the house
holds patronages through marriages and cohabitation."
The colonial political economy further increased the migration of
Hausa people into Y oruba land. This was due to the emergence of the
colonial capitalist economy which introduced taxes and opened up roads
and railways linking all the major cities of Nigeria. Hopkins ( 1 973) be
lieves that such factors encouraged and facilitated the increase in migra
tion of Nigerians generally. Furthermore, Swindell ( 1 984) observes that
"as the twentieth century developed, labour migration clearly took on
new dimension and, from what can be inferred, there was a rapid in
crease in the volume of migration to meet new levels of taxation and
demands for labour in the towns and commercial crop zones." Conse
quently, this trend has heightened competition for the available scarce
resources between hosts and settlers across major towns in Nigeria until
to day . This is also the case with Wukari Local Government Area of
Taraba State, which is an amalgam of different ethnic and religious
populations and has consequently witnessed many violent ethnic and re
ligiously induced conflicts.
Recently, Wukari has been experiencing a protracted ethno-relig
ious conflict and the main cause of the conflict has been the struggle for
the control of Wukari land and, by extension, competition for the eco
nomic and political resources in the area between the Jukun Christians
allied with the Jukun traditionalists and the Jukun Muslims supported by
Hausa Muslims in the area. Both parties hold tenaciously to their dispa
rate narratives which they often express. On one hand, the Jukun Chris
tians in alliance with the Jukun traditionalists accuse the Jukun Muslims
supported by Hausa Muslims of wanting to deliberately and systemati
cally violate the Jukun traditional culture by planning to politically con-
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trol Wukari. The Jukun Christians, who consider themselves not only the
owners of Wukari land but also the custodians of the Jukun traditional
culture, are prepared to spill their last blood to defend it from the en
croachment of the Muslim Jukun supported by the Rausa Muslim settlers
on Wukari land.
On the other hand, the Jukun Muslims supported by Rausa Muslims
accuse the Jukun Christians and the Jukun traditionalists of excluding
them from the political control of Wukari Local Government Area as
well as from the traditional Council. These are the real issues in the con
flict and these issues have encouraged the politicization of both ethnic
and religious identities in Wukari area. This is so because scholars have
argued that ethnic and religious conflicts are rooted in the politicization
of ethnic and religious identities and the competition and conflict for
political power by the ethnic and religious communities respectively
(Anarfi, 2004; Conversi, 1 999). More specifically, Takaya ( 1 992: 1 1 2)
identified centrifugal factors that gave rise to the politicization of ethnic
and religious identities in Nigeria, which include:
(i) the existence of two or more ethnic and religious groups with nu
merical strengths that can significantly affect the outcome and di
rection of a democratic political process ;
(ii) the instrumentalization o f ethnicity and religion a s a legitimizing
tool of hegemony in instances when the interests of the political
class are under threat;
(iii) when there is an ascendant radical thinking within a politically sig
nificant ethnic or religious group capable of upstaging hegemony ;
(iv) when the society is characterized by political, social or economic
hardships that can cause alliances along ethnic and religious fault
lines.
The persistent conflicts between Jukun Christians/Jukun traditionalists
versus the Jukun Muslims supported by Rausa Muslims have led to loss
of many lives and the destruction of much property and have distorted
inter-group re lation s in the Wukari community. The mixture of ethnicity
and religion have taken the situation between the warring groups to
unimaginable and deadly heights such that brothers and sisters who have
the same ancestral linkage and have co-existed in harmony for centuries
have suddenly turned on one another with murderous fervor, a situation
re-enforced by bitter and dangerous politics.
The vulnerability of the Wukari community to violent conflicts can
be attributed mainly to factors such as: the contest for indigeneship of
Wukari LGA; competition for political, social and economic space; the
problem of youth unemployment; and arms proliferation in the area. It is
in the light of these factors that Mitchell (2000) asserts that conflicts
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involving settlers and natives usually revolve around the question of
land, and in most cases around the quest by settlers to dispossess the
natives of their land through what he called migratory overcrowding.
Mitchell' s assertion can be said to be true about the Wukari community
which is an area that is agriculturally rich and has often resulted in vio
lent competition for resources between the Jukun, who consider them
selves as the natives of Wukari, against the other ethnic groups such as
Tiv, Fulanis and Hausa communities in Wukari.
The Jukun Christians/Jukun traditionalists believe that the Hausal
Fulani settlers are collaborating with the Jukun Muslims and that their
hidden agenda is to Islamize and take over Jukun land. This suspicion of
the Jukun Christians and Jukun traditionalists is also the same one that is
held by most host communities where the HausaIFulani groups are set
tled. This accounts for why the HausalFulani settlers are much resented,
which along with their domineering tendencies, makes the host commu
nities discriminate against them. Best (2006) has rightly observed that
"the struggle of ethnic minorities, framed by their experience of domina
tion, tends to be targeted primarily against the HausaIFulani, and indi
rectly against the Nigerian State". The mobilization of religious and
ethnic sentiments and solidarity towards gaining control over Wukari
land has been fueling violent conflicts between the Jukun Christians in
alliance with the Jukun traditionalists against the Jukun Muslims also in
alliance with the Hausa settlers in Wukari.
Another maj or cause of the violent ethno-religious conflicts in
Wukari is the availability of small and big arms in the area. For instance,
Wukari has witnessed so many violent conflicts such as the protracted
violent conflicts between the Jukun and Tiv which, according to
Momodu (20 1 4), is:
One of the most violent and recurring ethnic conflicts
that have occurred in Nigeria and the periodic clashes
between the two groups span from the 1 860s to 1 899,
1 904, 1 950s, 1 964, 1 976, 1 987; and from 1 990- 1 993 and
200 1 -2002, it climaxed into violent warfare. The human,
economic, political, social and psychological costs asso
ciated with these perennial conflicts are colossal and
some of these costs are still very visible in Wukari
(Momodu, 20 1 4) .
Wukari has also witnessed pockets o f skirmishes between the Tiv and
Fulani, Jukun and Fulani as well the current persistent ethno-religious
conflicts in the area. These several crises have deeply entrenched the
culture of violence in inter-group relations in the area. Momodu (20 1 4)
established that, "the free usage of arms especially by the Tiv and Jukun
militias to kill and maim indicates the magnitude of proliferation of arms
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in Wukari and its environs and it also suggests the vulnerability of
Wukari to violent conflicts." This situation therefore underscores the
"privatisation of violence that challenges the monopoly of violence as a
defining feature of the state" (Debiel, 2002). The proliferation of arms in
Wukari has made the area unstable and unsecured.
Clearly, the Wukari community is Balkanized along ethnic and re
ligious fault lines thus resulting in a situation where the Jukun Christians
lack confidence or trust in their fellow Jukun Muslims or HausalFulani
settlers in Wukari community. As a result, there currently exists a psy
chological and physical fault line between the Jukun Christians and
Jukun Traditionalists on one hand and on the other hand the Jukun Mus
lims and HausalFulani. This situation has often given the impetus for
violent conflicts. This tendency if not checked will continue to create
instability in the area, which is the way in which it is currently playing
out.
IMPACT OF ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS ON INTER-GROUP RELATIONS IN
WUKARI LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF TARABA S TATE
The following table is the time line of violent conflicts in Wukari
Local Government Area of Taraba State, Nigeria between 2000 up till
date.
TIME LINE OF VIOLENT ETHNO- RELIGIOUS C ONFLICTS IN WUKARI
L.G.A. FROM 2000 - 20 1 4
Sino:

Triggers

Period

1.

The destruction of a mosque under

Early 2000

construction at the premises of FRSC

Casualties
1 8 people were
killed while

Office Wukari by Jukun youths led to

several properties

a violent conflict between the

were destroyed

Christians and Muslims

2.

An argument between a royal prince
and some Muslim youths over right

October 1 7 ,
2005

of way led to a violent conflict
between Jukun Christians and Hausa!
Jukun Muslims
3.

The demolition o f a mosque built at
the Area Command Headquarters of
the Nigeria Police by Jukun Christian
Youths led to violent conflict between
Christian Jukun and Hausa I Jukun
Muslims

7 people were
killed while
several properties
were destroyed

July 1 3 , 20 1 0

1 0 people were
killed while
several others
were inj ured and
several properties
destroyed. Over
2000 people were
displaced.
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The accidental shooting of a Jukun
youth during an argument over the

February 2 3 ,
20 1 3

use of a football field by two
opposing teams triggers a violent
ethno-religious conflict

1 15

3 4 0 people were
killed, several
properties
destroyed while
several people
were displaced.

5.

A misunderstanding between

May 3, 20 1 3

Christians and Muslims during the

Over 500 people
were killed while

burial procession of one of the Jukun

several people

Traditional Rulers led to a violent
conflict

were injured. More
than 1 00 buildings
were destroyed
and over 3,000
people di splaced.

6.

Armed Fulani herdsmen attacked

April 3, 20 1 4

Ando-Manu village in Wukari LGA

The Village Head
was killed and
several people
were injured,
while several
villagers in the
area were
displaced to
Wukari town.

7.

Armed Jukun Youths attacked Jibu

April 7, 20 1 4

town for allegedly harboring and

8.

7 3 people were
killed while

accommodating Fulani herdsmen that

several others

attacked Ando Manu village

were injured

A reprisal attack by Fulani herdsmen

April 1 4 ,

3 people were

from Jibu town against Jukuns in

20 1 4

killed i n Nwokyo
village and more

Nwokyo village for attacking Fulani
herdsmen in Jibu

than 1 5 houses
were destroyed
with several
people displaced

9.

The attack o n Nwokyo village by

April 1 5 ,

Over 273 people

Fulani herdsmen led to a violent

20 1 4

were killed, 48
houses burnt and

ethno-religious crisis between Jukun

Christians and Hausa/lukun Muslims

several people
injured. Also, over
5 000 people were
displaced

1 0.

The April 1 5th crisis in Wukari

April 1 9th,

spilled over to Gindin-Dorowa town

20 1 4

Over 1 20 people
were killed with
several properties
destroyed and a lot
of people were
displaced to
Wukari town

1 1.

Jukun youths attacked Chinkai village
in reprisal attack against Hausa
Jukun Muslims

/

May 25th,
20 1 4

62 people were
killed while over
40 buildings were
burnt down and
lots of people
were displaced
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1 2.

Another violent ethno-religious

June 1 5th,

conflict erupted between the Jukun

20 1 4

Christians and JukunlHausa Muslims
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About 300 people
were killed, while
over 200 buildings

as result of the burning of a phone

were destroyed in

booth owned by a Hausa Muslim by

Wukari metropolis .

a n unknown assailant.
13.

The violence that erupted o n the 1 5th

June 1 5th,

About 30 people

of June in Wukari spilled over to

20 1 4

were killed, while

Rafin Kada, a neighbouring Jukun

a lot of buildings

settlement.

were also
destroyed.

14.

Un-known gun men from Ibi and

August 1 7th,

About 1 3 were

Bantaji towns, attacked Nwuban, a

20 1 4

reportedly killed

Jukun Village, in Wukari Local

and many

Government Area.

properties worth
thousands of Naira
were destroyed as
well as many
people displaced
from their homes.

15.

Another violent ethno-religious

September

About people were

conflict erupted in Wukari.

2nd, 20 1 4

reported killed
while several
properties were
destroyed and
many people were
displaced from
Wukari town.

16.

Suspected Fulani herdsmen attacked

1 4th

About 20 people

Tunari village in Wukari Local

September,

were killed

Government

20 1 4

including several
buildings
destroyed.

17.

Unknown gunmen attacked Tsundi

19 October,

26 people were

town on Sunday

20 1 4

Killed while 5
people were
wounded and
several people
displaced from
Tsondi town

1 8.

Unknown assailants attacked and
killed a Jukun along Federal
University road in Wukari .There was

On 7
November,
20 1 4

About 1 5 people
were killed.

a reprisal attack b y Jukun youth the
next day.
19.

Another violent crisis happened in
Wukari as a result of the November
7th attack.

On 8
November,
20 1 4

1 2 people lost
their lives

20.

A violent crisis erupted on at GidinDoruwa a settlement in Wukari Local
Government.Area .

2 December,
20 1 4

44 people were
killed, while
several houses
were destroyed.

Source: Researcher 's survey, 2014
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A cursory look at the above time line of the violent ethno-religious con
flicts in Wukari Local Government Area of Taraba State reveals that the
conflict is primarily rooted in the struggle for political and economic
control of Wukari, which assumed ethnic and religious dimensions. The
persistent nature of the conflict also indicates that it has become pro
tracted, particularly from April 20 1 4 to date. Generally, the impact of the
violent ethno-religious conflicts on inter-group relations in Wukari Local
Government Area of Taraba State can be categorized as follows:
o

•
•
•

Humanitarian impact
Economic impact
Social impact
Political impact
HUMANITARIAN IMPACT

Violent ethno-religious conflict in Wukari community has claimed
so many lives of the residents of the area, especially Christians and Mus
lims, Jukun and Hausa! Fulani. For instance, The People 's Daily of Mon
day June 1 6, 20 1 4, reported that about thirty-two people were killed in
Wukari. The persistent ethno-religious conflicts in the area also led to the
displacement of many residents of Wukari. The Guardian Newspaper of
Monday, August 1 8 , 20 1 4 indicated that there were many displaced per
sons from the incidences of ethno-religious conflicts while The Premium
Newspaper also observed that over seven hundred (700) people were dis
placed from Wukari.
ECONOMIC IMPACT

The persistent ethno-religious conflicts in the Wukari Local Gov
ernment Area of Taraba State have also negatively impacted the econ
omy of the area. The Tiv farmers whose farming resourcefulness is the
mainstay of the economy of Wukari as well as the Igbo traders are now
both moving out in large numbers from the area for fear of their lives.
This situation has greatly affected commerce and the economy of area.
SOCIAL IMPACT

Social interactions have been dislocated by the persistent ethno-re
ligious conflicts in the Wukari town and its environs. There is social and
psychological separation between the Jukun Christians and the Jukun/
Hausa Muslims, deepened by mutual hatred and suspicion. The violence
has also created a divided settlement pattern separating 'Jukun Christian/
jukun traditionalist settlement' and 'JukunlHausa Muslim settlement. ' By
this settlement pattern, neither side could risk crossing to the other side
without being killed.
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POLITICAL IMPACT
Politics in the area has also been negatively impacted by the persis
tent ethno-religious conflicts in Wukari. The political machinery of the
area is controlled by the Jukun Christians and the Jukun Traditionalists.
The Jukun Muslims and Hausa Muslims feel excluded from the politics
of the area. The Jukun Muslims in particular feel that it is wrong for the
Jukun Christians and Jukun Traditionalists to exclude them from what is
rightfully theirs and vent their anger and frustration by repudiating and
vilifying the Jukun culture, which the Jukun Christians and Jukun Tradi
tionalists perceive as an abomination which must be corrected by all the
means possible. During election periods, votes are often cast along relig
ious lines and the Jukun Christians, because of their shear numerical size
and the support it enjoys from its allies, the Jukun Traditionalists, domi
nates the political landscape of Wukari Local Government Area of
Taraba State.
S UGGESTED SOLUTIONS TO THE MANAGEMENT OF ETHNO-RELIGIOUS
CONFLICTS ON INTER-GROUP RELATIONS IN WUKARI LOCAL
GOVERNMENT OF TARABA S TATE
Ethno-religious conflict is a common feature of most multi-cultural
and divided societies, as Rabushka and Shepsle ( 1 972) assert in their
famous work, Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Insta
bility. According to Rabushka and Shepsle, "divided states remain peren
nially unstable and many survive on the brink of collapse and
disintegration." Divided states also lack the capacity to manage the di
verse groups interests, as Jinadu (2007) rightly observes about the nature
and character of the state:
. . . the state and its institutions are ethnicised and im
mersed in clientelist ethnic and religious networks and in
ethnic/religious based struggle to implant and entrench
ethnic or religious 'gatekeepers' in critical, key positions
in the bureaucracy and educational institutions, and in
other public sector institutions and even in the private
sector, which in many African countries relies heavily
on the public sector (Jinadu, 2007) .
Notwithstanding the above position, a very fundamental truth that
must be stressed at this juncture is the fact that most conflicts in divided
societies have become protracted and irresolvable primarily because peo
ple still largely believe that it is only the state that has the capacity, or the
magic-wand, to resolve conflicts when it is in fact the state that is gener
ating social conflicts within its domain through its actions and inactions.
Rummel ( 1 994) argues that the "government of any state is the greatest
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potential threat to any group inside its boundaries." It is imperative there
fore that citizens and communities should understand that they are the
ones who need to manage their problems, hence they must establish
mechanisms and strategies that will effectively address the problems
confronting them. No community or society can exist in isolation of
other communities because communities exist interdependently. In this
regard, Touval ( 1 985) has rightly observed that the "pluralistic character
of most African states has led to the development of mechanisms of ad
justment enabling the accommodation of the interests and needs of di
verse ethnic groups. Most have developed norms and procedures
enabling the maintenance of an ethnic (religious) balance within the po
litical and administrative institutions."
The following suggestions are proffered towards permanently ad
dressing the persistent ethno-religious conflicts in Wukari Local Govern
ment Area of Taraba State:
a).

Establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Committee

Peace, as a valuable gem cannot be decreed unto any society be
cause it requires the collective resolve of all stakeholders in order to
plant the seed of peace, nurture it, and harvest its fruits. Peace, therefore,
requires true reconciliation among all the stakeholders in any society in
order for it to be instituted and sustained. The persistent ethno-religious
conflicts in Wukari community have negatively affected the political, ec
onomic, social and cultural landscapes of Wukari, with debilitating nega
tive implications on inter-group relations in the area. All of the
stakeholders in Wukari, especially the Jukun Christians and Jukun Tradi
tionalists, Jukun Muslims and the Hausa Muslims, should immediately
agree to establish a Truth and Reconciliation Committee that will be sad
dled with the responsibility of reconciling the parties involved in the
conflict.

Michael Ignatieff ( 1 996), remarks, "as the African proverb reminds
us, 'truth is not always good to say' , but when it is shared, it is capable of
healing the wounds." Therefore, the establishment of a Truth and Recon
ciliation Committee (TRC) is important because it will create the plat
form that will assist the warring parties in Wukari to make sense of the
complex issues involved in the conflict as well as reconcile them. As
Lerche (2000) argues, all sides have their own version of the truth of
"what really happened." The parties will be able to reconcile the issues
that had hitherto been irreconcilable. Some of these issues are what Har
old Saunders identifies as: "fear, suspicion, rejection, mistrust, (exclusion
and marginalization), hatred and misperception which are often greater
obstacles to peace than an inability to resolve technically definable
problems".

1 20

b).

ETHNIC STUDIES REVIEW

[Vol. 36: 1 05

Power Sharing Arrangement

It is a fact that most and if not all ethno-religious conflicts are inex
tricably linked to the competition for political and economic resources
and the tool that is often used in such competition is identity politics
which is usually done by invoking the dare-devil politics of indigene
versus settler dichotomy. In this contest, an indigene is perceived to be
somebody who is historically affiliated to the place or town or commu
nity or locality being contested for and by the virtue of hislher affiliation
to the place, he/she enjoys some certain rights and benefits that those
who are considered as settlers in the area cannot enjoy.
On the other hand, a settler is perceived as a person who does not
have historical affiliation to a place or town or community or locality,
due to this, he or she is excluded from enjoying certain rights and bene
fits that those who considers themselves indigenous to the place enj oy.
This kind of perception and definition is a total violation of the concept
of citizenship which is supposed to guarantee every bona fide citizen the
legal right to enjoy the basic rights and benefits available in any part of a
sovereign state. This is the reason why Ibrahim (2000: 69) argues that
ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria are linked to citizenship within the
context of identity, which is rooted in the politics of inclusion or exclu
sion. These are tied to claims and counter-claims over identity as a basis
for determining who is excluded or included from decision making as
well as access to opportunities under the 'we' versus 'them' cliche
(Kwaj a, 2008: 83). At the core of ethnic agitations and conflicts are "dis
tributive questions, which are the fundamental sources of ethnic tensions
in Nigeria" (Nnoli 1 978 and 1 994).
As pointed out by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly
Conflicts ( 1 997 : 1 00):
In many multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies, the
procedures of majoritarian democracy have proven ef
fective for managing group relations and maintaining so
cial cohesion. However, in societies with deep ethnic
and religious divisions and little experience with demo
cratic government and the rule of law, strict majoritarian
democracy can be self-defeating. Where ethnic and re
ligious identities are strong and national identity weak,
the population may vote largely along ethnic or religious
lines. Domination by one ethnic or religious group(s)
can lead to a tyranny of the majority [emphasis added]
( 1 00).
Indeed, it is always very important for communities and societies
experiencing conflict to avoid both the tyranny of the majority and the
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revengeful terrorism of the minority, and to understand that they have to
work together to resolve their differences so as to build a just and fair
community or society in which the rights and interests of all can be guar
anteed. This example can also be applied to the Wukari case. Both the
Jukun Christians and the Jukun Traditionalists who are the majority in
Wukari Local Government Area of Taraba State and the minority Jukun
Muslims who are always in alliance with the Hausa Muslims in the area
must come to the understanding that they need to work out an inclusive
political arrangement that would give both sides, and even the other
groups resident in the area, the sense of belonging in the political archi
tecture of Wukari. This is especially because some researchers on con
flict management have pointed out that the openness of political
institutions decreases the chances of occurrences of violent conflict and
protests (e.g. , Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyven-dak and Giugni, 1 995). This is
important because inclusive political arrangements reduce the tendency
of competing groups resorting to violent agitations. The adoption of this
practice will therefore assist in the accommodation of diversity, which
will allay the fears of both the ethnic and religious minorities in the area
as well as guarantee the protection of the rights of all the residents of
Wukari. In addition, it will assist in the transformation of the perception
of ethnic and religious loyalties from being a threat to the social cohesion
of Wukari to being utilized as an engine of socio-economic development.
CONCLUSION

Religion and ethnicity are two very important tools that the elites in
Nigeria employ in constructing and mobilizing identity in competitive
situations. Identity politics have resulted in violent and uncontrollable
conflicts of different intensity and magnitudes. The major task of this
paper has been to examine the dynamics of the persistent ethno-religious
conflicts in Wukari area of Taraba State, Nigeria and the possibility for
its sustainable management. The paper therefore proposed some very ro
bust strategies for tackling the persistent ethno-religious conflicts in
Wukari community with a view to making all the residents of Wukari,
regardless of their ethnic or religious divide, work out some kind of mo
dus vivendi that would enable them to accommodate each other and
peacefully coexist. This is with the understanding that no community can
exist in isolation of other communities hence communities exist
interdependently.
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